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Abstract. This paper proposes a qualitative approach to solve multi-
criteria decision making problems under possibilistic uncertainty. De-
pending on the decision maker attitude with respect to uncertainty (i.e.
optimistic or pessimistic) and on her attitude with respect to criteria (i.e.
conjunctive or disjunctive), four ex-ante and four ex-post decision rules
are defined and investigated. In particular, their coherence w.r.t. the
principle of monotonicity, that allows Dynamic Programming is studied.
1 Introduction
A popular criterion to compare decisions under risk is the expected utility model
(EU ) axiomatized by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [9]. This model relies on
a probabilistic representation of uncertainty: an elementary decision is repre-
sented by a probabilistic lottery over the possible outcomes. The preferences of
the decision maker are supposed to be captured by a utility function assigning
a numerical value to each consequence. The evaluation of a lottery is then per-
formed through the computation of its expected utility (the greater, the better).
When several independent criteria are to be taken into account, the utility func-
tion is the result of the aggregation of several utility functions ui (one for each
criterion). The expected utility of the additive aggregation can then be used
to evaluate the lottery, and it is easy to show that it is equal to the additive
aggregation of the mono-criterion expected utilities.
These approaches presuppose that both numerical probability and additive
utilities are available. When the information about uncertainty cannot be quan-
tified in a probabilistic way the topic of possibilistic decision theory is often
a natural one to consider. Giving up the probabilistic quantification of uncer-
tainty yields to give up the EU criterion as well. The development of possibilistic
decision theory has lead to the proposition and the characterization of (mono-
criterion) possibilistic counterparts of expected utility: Dubois and Prade [3]
propose two criteria based on possibility theory, an optimistic and a pessimistic
one, whose definitions only require a finite ordinal scale for evaluating both util-
ity and plausibility. Likewise, qualitative approaches of multi-criteria decision
making have been advocated, leading to the use of Sugeno Integrals (see e.g. [1,
8]) and especially weighted maximum and weighted minimum [2].
In this paper, we consider possibilistic decision problems in the presence of
multiple criteria. The difficulty is here to make a double aggregation. Several
attitudes are possible: shall we consider the pessimistic/optimistic utility value
of a weighted min (or max)? or shall we rather aggregate with a weighted min (or
max) the individual pessimistic (or optimistic) utilities provided by the criteria?
In short, shall we proceed in an ex-ante or ex-post way?
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a
refresher on possibilistic decision making under uncertainty using Dubois and
Prade’s pessimistic and optimistic utilities, on one hand, and on the qualita-
tive approaches of MCDM (mainly, weighted min and weighted max), on the
other hand. Section 3 develops our proposition, defining four ex-ante and four
ex-post aggregations, and shows that when the decision maker attitude is ho-
mogeneous, i.e. either fully min-oriented or fully max-oriented, the ex-ante and
the ex-post possibilistic aggregations provide the same result. Section 4 studies
the monotonicity of these decision rules, in order to determine the applicability
of Dynamic Programming to sequential decision making problems.1
2 Background on one-stage decision making in a
possibilistic framework
2.1 Decision making under possibilistic uncertainty (U+ and U−)
Following Dubois and Prade’s possibilistic approach of decision making under
qualitative uncertainty, a one stage decision can be seen as a possibility distri-
bution over a finite set of outcomes also called a (simple) possibilistic lottery
[3]. Since we consider a finite setting, we shall write L = 〈λ1/x1, . . . , λn/xn〉 s.t.
λi = pif (xi) is the possibility that decision f leads to outcome xi; this possi-
bility degree can also be denoted by L[xi]. We denote L the set of all simple
possibilistic lotteries.
In this framework, a decision problem is thus fully specified by a set ∆ of
possibilistic lotteries on a set of consequences X and a utility function u : X 7→
[0, 1]. Under the assumption that the utility scale and the possibility scale are
commensurate and purely ordinal, Dubois and Prade have proposed the following
qualitative degrees for evaluating any simple lottery L = 〈λ1/x1, . . . , λn/xn〉:
Optimistic utility (U+) [3, 15, 16]: U+(L) = max
xi∈X
min(λi, u(xi)) (1)
Pessimistic utility (U−) [3, 14]: U−(L) = min
xi∈X
max((1− λi), u(xi))
(2)
The value U−(L) is high only if L gives good consequences in every “rather
plausible” state. This criterion generalizes the Wald criterion, which estimates
1 Proofs relative to this paper are omitted for lack of space; they are available on
ftp://ftp.irit.fr/IRIT/ADRIA/PapersFargier/ipmu14.pdf
the utility of an act by its worst possible consequence. U−(L) is thus “pes-
simistic” or “cautious”. On the other hand, U+(L) is a mild version of the
maximax criterion which is “optimistic”, or “adventurous”: act L is good as
soon as it is totally plausible that it gives a good consequence.
2.2 Multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) using Agg+ and Agg−
The previous setting assumes a clear ranking of X by a single preference cri-
terion, hence the use of a single utility function u. When several criteria, say
a set C = {c1...cp} of p criteria, have to be taken into account, u shall be
replaced by a vector u = 〈u1, . . . , up〉 of utility functions uj : X 7→ [0, 1]
and the global (qualitative) utility of each consequence x ∈ X can be evalu-
ated either in a conjunctive, cautious, way according to the Wald aggregation
(Agg−(x) = min
j=1,p
uj(x)), or in an disjunctive way according to its max-oriented
counterpart (Agg+(x) = max
j=1,p
uj(x)). When the criteria are not equally impor-
tant, a weight wj ∈ [0, 1] can be associated to each cj . Hence the following
definitions relative to multi-criteria utilities [2]:
Agg+(x) = max
j=1,p
min(wj , uj(x)). (3)
Agg−(x) = min
j=1,p
max((1− wj), uj(x)). (4)
These utilities are particular cases of the Sugeno integral [1, 8, 13]:
Aggγ,u(L) = max
λ∈[0,1]
min(λ, γ(Fλ)) (5)
where Fλ = {cj ∈ C, uj(x) ≥ λ}, γ is a monotonic set-function that reflects the
importance of criteria’s set. Agg+ is recovered when γ is the possibility measure
based on the weight distribution (γ(E) = max
cj∈E
wj), and Agg
− is recovered when
γ corresponds to necessity measure (γ(E) = min
cj /∈E
(1− wj)).
3 Multi-criteria decision making under possibilistic
uncertainty
Let us now study possibilistic decision making in a multi-criteria context. Given
a set X of consequences, a set C of independent criteria we define a multi-criteria
decision problem under possibilistic uncertainty as triplet 〈∆,w,u〉2 where:
– ∆ is a set of possibilistic lotteries;
2 Classical problems of decision under possibilistic uncertainty are recovered when
|C| = 1 ; Classical MCDM problems are recovered when all the lotteries in ∆ asso-
ciate possibility 1 to some xi and possibility 0 to all the other elements of X: ∆ is
identified to X, i.e. is a set of “alternatives” for the MCDM decision problem.
– w ∈ [0, 1]p is a weighting vector: wj denotes the weight of criterion cj ;
– u = 〈u1, . . . , up〉 is a vector of p utility functions on X: uj(xi) ∈ [0, 1] is the
utility of xi according to criterion cj ;
Our aim consists in comparing lotteries according to decision maker’s prefer-
ences relative to their different consequences (captured by the utility functions)
and the importance of the criteria (captured by the weighting vector). To do
this, we can proceed in two different ways namely ex-ante or ex-post :
– The ex-ante aggregation consists in first determining the aggregated utilities
(Agg+ or Agg−) relative to each possible consequence xi of L and then
combine them with the possibility degrees.
– The ex-post aggregation consists in computing the (optimistic or pessimistic)
utilities relative to each criterion cj , and then perform the aggregation (Agg
+
or Agg−) using the criteria’s weights.
We borrow this terminology from economics and social welfare economics,
were agents play the role played by criteria in the present context (see e.g. [7,
10]). Setting the problem in a probabilistic context, these works have shown that
the two approaches can lead to different results (the so-called “timing effect”)
coincide iff the collective utility is affine. As a matter of fact, it is easy to show
that the expected utility of the weighted sum is the sum of the expected utilities.
Let us go back to possibilistic framework. The decision maker’s attitude with
respect to uncertainty can be either optimistic (U+) or pessimistic (U−) and her
attitude with respect to criteria can be either conjunctive (Agg+) or disjunctive
(Agg−), hence the definition of four approaches of MCDM under uncertainty,
namely U++, U+−, U−+ and U−−; the first (resp. the second) indices denoting
the attitude of the decision maker w.r.t. uncertainty (resp. criteria).
Each of these utilities can be computed either ex-ante or ex-post. Hence the
definition of eight utilities:
Definition 1. Given a possibilistic lottery L on X, a set of criteria C defining
a vector of utility functions u and weighting vector w, let:
U++ante(L) = max
xi∈X
min(L[xi],max
cj∈C
min(uj(xi), wj)). (6)
U−−ante(L) = min
xi∈X
max((1− L[xi]), min
cj∈C
max(uj(xi), (1− wj))). (7)
U+−ante(L) = max
xi∈X
min(L[xi], min
cj∈C
max(uj(xi), (1− wj))). (8)
U−+ante(L) = min
xi∈X
max((1− L[xi]),max
cj∈C
min(uj(xi), wj)). (9)
U++post(L) = max
cj∈C
min(wj ,max
xi∈X
min(uj(xi), L[xi])). (10)
U−−post(L) = min
cj∈C
max((1− wj), min
xi∈X
max(uj(xi), (1− L[xi]))). (11)
U+−post(L) = min
cj∈C
max((1− wj),max
xi∈X
min(uj(xi), L[xi])). (12)
U−+post(L) = max
cj∈C
min(wj , min
xi∈X
max(uj(xi), (1− L[xi]))). (13)
Interestingly, the optimistic aggregations are related to their pessimistic coun-
terparts by duality as stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let P = 〈∆,w,u〉 be a qualitative decision problem, let P τ =
〈∆,w,uτ 〉 be the inverse problem, i.e. the problem such that for any xi ∈ X, cj ∈
C, uτj (xi) = 1− uj(xi). Then, for any L ∈ ∆:
U++ante(L) = 1− U
τ−−
ante (L) U
++
post(L) = 1− U
τ−−
post (L)
U−−ante(L) = 1− U
τ++
ante (L) U
−−
post(L) = 1− U
τ++
post (L)
U+−ante(L) = 1− U
τ−+
ante (L) U
+−
post(L) = 1− U
τ−+
post (L)
U−+ante(L) = 1− U
τ+−
ante (L) U
−+
post(L) = 1− U
τ+−
post (L)
As previously said the ex-ante and the ex-post approaches coincide in the prob-
abilistic case. Likewise, the following Proposition 2 shows that when the deci-
sion maker attitude is homogeneous, i.e. either fully min-oriented or fully max-
oriented, the ex-ante and the ex-post possibilistic aggregations provide the same
result.
Proposition 2. For any L ∈ L, U++ante(L) = U
++
post(L) and U
−−
ante(L) = U
−−
post(L).
Hence, for any multi-criteria decision problem under possibilistic uncertainty,
U++ante (resp. U
−−
ante) is equal to U
++
post (resp. U
−−
post). Such an equivalence between
the ex-ante and ex-post does not hold for U+− nor for U−+, as shown by the
following counter-example.
Counter-example 1 Consider a set C of two equally important criteria c1 and
c2, and a lottery L (cf. Figure 1) leading to two equi-possible consequences x1
and x2 such that x1 is good for c1 and bad for c2, and x2 is bad for c1 and
good for c2; i.e. L[x1] = L[x2] = 1, w1 = w2 = 1, u1(x1) = u2(x2) = 1 and
u2(x1) = u1(x2) = 0.
1 
1 
x1 , u(x1) = <1,0> 
L 
x2, u(x2) = <1,0> 
1 L’ x3, u(x3) = <0.5,0.5> 
Fig. 1. Lotteries L and L′ relative to counter-example 1
We can check that U+−ante(L) = 0 6= U
+−
post(L) = 1:
U+−ante(L) = max ( min(L[x1],min(max(u1(x1), (1− w1)),max(u2(x1), (1− w2)))),
min(L[x2],min(max(u1(x2), (1− w1)),max(u2(x2), (1− w2))))).
= max ( min(1,min(max(1, (1− 1)),max(0, (1− 1)))) ,
min(1,min(max(0, (1− 1)),max(1, (1− 1)))))
= 0.
U+−post(L) = min ( max((1− w1),max(min(u1(x1), L[x1]),min(u1(x2), L[x2]))),
max((1− w2),max(min(u2(x1), L[x1]),min(u2(x2), L[x2])))).
= min ( max((1− 1),max(min(1, 1),min(0, 1))) ,
max((1− 1),max(min(0, 1),min(1, 1))))
= 1 .
The ex-ante and ex-post approaches may lead to different rankings of lotteries.
Consider for instance, a lottery L′ leading to the consequence x3 for sure, i.e.
L′[x3] = 1 and L
′[xi] = 0, ∀i 6= x3 (such a lottery is called a constant lottery),
with u1(x3) = u2(x3) = 0.5 . It is easy to check that U
+−
ante(L
′) = U+−post(L
′) = 0.5
i.e. U+−ante(L) < U
+−
ante(L
′) while U+−post(L) > U
+−
post(L
′).
Using the same lotteries L and L′, we can show that:
U−+ante(L) = 1 6= U
−+
post(L) = 0 and that U
−+
ante(L
′) = U−+post(L
′) = 0.5; then
U−+post(L
′) > U−+post(L) while U
−+
ante(L
′) < U−+ante(L): like U
+−, U−+ are subject to
the timing effect.
In summary, U−+ and U+− suffer from the timing effect, contrary to U−− and
U++.
4 Multi-criteria sequential decision making under
possibilistic uncertainty
Possibilistic sequential decision making relies on possibilistic compound lotter-
ies[3], that is a possibility distributions over (simple or compound) lotteries.
Compound lotteries indeed allow the representation of decision policies or “strate-
gies”, that associate a decision to each decision point: the execution of the deci-
sion may lead to several more or less possible situations, where new decisions are
to be made, etc. For instance, in a two stages decision problem, a first decision is
made and executed; then, depending on the observed situation, a new, one stage,
decision is to be made, that lead to the final consequences. The decisions at the
final stage are simple lotteries, and the decision made at the first stage branches
on each of them. The global strategy thus defines to a compound lottery .
To evaluate a strategy by U+, U− or, in the case of MCDM under uncer-
tainty by any of the eight aggregated utility proposed in Section 3, the idea
is to “reduce” its compound lottery into an equivalent simple one. Consider
a compound lottery L = 〈λ1/L1, . . . , λm/Lm〉; the possibility of getting con-
sequence xi ∈ X from one of its sub lotteries Lk is pik,i = min(λk, Lk[xi])
(for the shake of simplicity, suppose that L′k are simple lotteries; the princi-
ple trivially extends to the general case). Hence, the possibility of getting xi
from L is the max, over all the Lk’s, of pik,i. Thus, [3] have proposed to re-
duce a compound lottery 〈λ1/L1, . . . , λm/Lm〉 into a simple lottery, denoted by
Reduction(〈λ1/L1, . . . , λm/Lm〉), that is considered as equivalent to the com-
pound one: Reduction(〈λ1/L1, . . . , λm/Lk〉) is the simple lottery that associate
to each xi the possibility degree maxk=1..mmin(λk, Lk[xi]) (with L[xi] = 0 when
none of the Lk’s give a positive possibility degree to consequence xi). See Figure
2 for an example.
(a) (b)
1
1
x1
x2
x3
x4
0.8
0.7
1
0.6
1
0.7
0.8
x1
x2
x3
x4
L2L1
Fig. 2. A compound lottery L1 (a) and its reduction L2 (b)
From a practical point of view, sequential decision problems are generally
stated through the use of compact representation formalisms, such as possibilis-
tic decision trees [4], possibilistic influence diagrams [5, 6] or possibilistic Markov
decision processes [11, 12]. The set of potential strategies to compare, ∆, is gen-
erally exponential w.r.t. the input size. So, an explicit evaluation of each strategy
in ∆ is not realistic. Such problems can nevertheless be solved efficiently, without
an explicit evaluation of the strategies, by Dynamic Programming algorithms as
soon as the decision rule leads to transitive preferences and satisfies the principle
of weak monotonicity. Formally, for any decision rule O (e.g. U+, U− or even any
of the decision rules proposed in the previous Section) over possibilistic lotteries,
≥O is said to be weakly monotonic iff whatever L, L
′ and L′′ and whatever (α,β)
such that max(α, β) = 1:
L O L
′ ⇒ 〈α/L, β/L′′〉 O 〈α/L
′, β/L′′〉. (14)
Such property ensures that each sub-strategy of an optimal strategy is optimal in
its sub-problem. This allows Dynamic Programming algorithms to build optimal
strategies in an incremental way (e.g. in decision tree, from the last decision to
the root of the tree).
[5, 4] have shown that U+ and U− are monotonic. Let us now study whether
it is also the case for the ex-ante and ex-post rules proposed in the previous
Section. The ex-ante approaches are the easiest to handle: once the vectors of
utilities have been aggregated according to Agg− (resp. Agg+), these approaches
collapse with the classical U+ and U− approaches. It is then easy to show that:
Proposition 3. U++ante, U
−−
ante, U
+−
ante and U
−+
ante satisfy the weak monotonicity.
Concerning U++post and U
−−
post, recall that the full optimistic and full pessimistic ex-
post utilities are equivalent to their ex-ante counterparts thanks to Proposition
2. This allows us to show that:
Proposition 4. U−−post and U
++
post satisfy the weak monotonicity.
It follows from Propositions 3 and 4 that when the decision is based either on an
ex-ante approach, or on U++post or U
−−
post, the algorithms proposed by Sabbadin et
al. [12, 5] can be used on multi-criteria possibilistic decision trees and influence
diagrams after their transformation into single-criterion problems: it is enough
to aggregate the vectors of utilities leading to the consequences x into single
utilities using Agg+ (for U++ante, U
−+
ante, U
++
post) or Agg
− (for U−−ante, U
+−
ante, U
−−
post)
to get an equivalent single criterion problem where the criterion to optimize is
simply U+ (for U++ante, U
+−
ante, U
++
post) or U
− (for U−−ante, U
−+
ante, U
−−
post).
Such approach cannot be applied when optimizing U−+post or U
+−
post. First be-
cause U+−post(L) 6= U
+−
ante(L) and U
−+
post(L) 6= U
+−
ante(L), i.e. the reduction of the
problem to the optimization w.r.t. U+ (resp. U−) of a single criterion prob-
lem obtained by aggregating the utilities with Agg− (resp. Agg+) can lead to
a wrong result. Worst, it is not even possible to apply Dynamic Programming,
since U−+post and U
+−
post do not satisfy the weak monotonicity property, as shown
by the following counter-example:
Counter-example 2 Let X = {x1, x2, x3} and consider two equally impor-
tant criteria c1 and c2 (w1 = w2 = 1) with : u1(x1) = 1, u1(x2) = 0.8,
u1(x3) = 0.5; u2(x1) = 0.6, u2(x2) = 0.8, u2(x3) = 0.8. Consider the lotter-
ies L = 〈1/x1, 0/x2, 0/x3〉, L
′ = 〈0/x1, 1/x2, 0/x3〉 and L
′′ = 〈0/x1, 0/x2, 1/x3〉:
L gives consequence x1 for sure, L
′ gives consequence x2 for sure and L
′′ gives
consequence x3 for sure. It holds that:
U−+post(L) = Agg
−(x1) = max(1, 0.6) = 1
U−+post(L
′) = Agg−(x2) = max(0.8, 0.8) = 0.8.
Hence L >U−+post
L′ with respect to the U−+post rule.
Consider now the compound lotteries L1 = 〈1/L, 1/L
′′〉 and L2 = 〈1/L
′, 1/L′′〉.
If the weak monotonicity principle were satisfied, we would get: L1 >U−+post
L2.Since:
Reduction(〈1/L, 1/L′′〉) = 〈1/x1, 0/x2, 1/x3〉 and Reduction(〈1/L
′, 1/L′′〉) =
〈0/x1, 1/x2, 1/x3〉. We have:
U−+post(L1) = U
−+
post(Reduction(〈1/L, 1/L
′′〉)) = 0.6.
U−+post(L2) = U
−+
post(Reduction(〈1/L
′, 1/L′′〉)) = 0.8.
Hence, L1 <U−+post
L2 while L >U−+post
L′, which contradicts weak monotonicity.
Using the fact that U+−post = 1 − U
τ−+
post , this counter-example is modified to
show that also U+−post does not satisfy the monotonicity principle. Consider two
equally important criteria, cτ1 and c
τ
2 with w1 = w2 = 1 with: u
τ
1(x1) = 0,
uτ1(x2) = 0.2, u
τ
1(x3) = 0.5; u
τ
2(x1) = 0.4, u
τ
2(x2) = 0.2, u
τ
2(x3) = 0.2. Consider
now the same lotteries L, L′ and L′′ presented above. It holds that:
U+−post(L) = Agg
−(x1) = 0 < U
+−
post(L
′) = Agg−(x2) = 0.2, while
U+−post(Reduction(〈1/L, 1/L
′′〉)) = 0.4 > U+−post(Reduction(〈1/L
′, 1/L′′〉)) = 0.2.
The lack of monotonicity of U−+post is not as dramatic as it may seem. When
optimizing U−+post(L), the decision maker is looking for a strategy that is good
w.r.t. U− for at least one criterion. This means that if it is possible to get for
each criterion cj a strategy that optimizes U
− according to this criterion (and
this can be done by Dynamic Programming, since U− do satisfy the principle of
monotonicity), the one with the higher U− is optimal w.r.t. U−+post(L). Formally:
Proposition 5. U−+post(L) = max
j=1,p
min(wj , U
−
j (L))
where U−j (L) = min
xi∈X
max((1 − L[xi]), uj(xi)) is the pessimistic utility of L ac-
cording to the sole criterion j.
Proposition 6. Let L be the set of lotteries that can be built on X and let:
– ∆∗ = {L∗1, . . . , L
∗
p} s.t. ∀L ∈ L, j ∈ 1 . . . p, U
−
j (L
∗
j ) ≥ U
−
j (L);
– L∗ ∈ ∆∗ s.t. ∀L∗j ∈ ∆
∗:max
j=1,p
min(wj , U
−
j (L
∗)) ≥ max
j=1,p
min(wj , U
−
j (L
∗
i )).
It holds that, for any L ∈ L, U−+post(L
∗) ≥ U−+post(L).
Hence, it is enough to optimize w.r.t. each criterion separately and to compare
the results to get an optimal strategy w.r.t. U−+post(L).
Let us finally study U+−post; an analog of Proposition 6 exists:
Proposition 7. U+−post(L) = min
j=1,p
max((1− wj), U
+
j (L))
where U+j (L) = max
xi∈X
min(L[xi], uj(xi)) is the optimistic utility of L according to
the sole criterion j.
But this proposition is helpless, since the lottery L maximizing this quantity is
not necessarily among those maximizing the U+j ’s: one lottery optimal for U
+
1
w.r.t. criterion c1 can be very bad for U
+
2 and thus bad for U
+−
post.
5 Conclusion
This paper has provided a first decision theoretical approach for evaluating multi-
criteria decision problems under possibilistic uncertainty. The combination of the
multi-criteria dimension, namely the conjunctive aggregation with a weighted
min (Agg−) or the disjunctive aggregation with a weighted max (Agg−) and the
decision maker’s attitude with respect to uncertainty (i.e. optimistic utility U+or
pessimistic utility U−) leads to four approaches of MCDM under possibilistic
uncertainty. Considering that each of these utilities can be computed either
ex-ante or ex-post, we have proposed the definition of eight aggregations, that
eventually reduce to six: U++ante (resp. U
−−
ante) has been shown to coincide with
U++post (resp. U
−−
post); such a coincidence does not happen for U
+− and U−+, that
suffer from timing effect.
Then, in order to use these decision rules in sequential decision problems, we
have proven that all ex-ante utilities (i.e. U++ante, U
−−
ante, U
+−
ante, U
−+
ante) satisfy the
weak monotonicity while for the ex-post utilities, only U++post and U
−−
post satisfy
this property. This result means that Dynamic Programming algorithms can
be used to compute strategies that are optimal w.r.t. the rules . We have also
shown that the optimization of U+−post can be handled thanks to a call of a series
of optimization of pessimistic utilities (one for each criterion). The question of
the optimization of U−+post still remains open.
This preliminary work call for several developments. First of all we intend, as
future work, to propose and test suitable algorithms to solve sequential qualita-
tive multi-criteria decision problems, e.g. influence diagrams and decision trees.
From a more theoretical point of view we have to propose a general axiomatic
characterization of our six decision rules. Finally, considering that the possibilis-
tic aggregations used here are basically specializations of the Sugeno integral,
we aim at generalizing the study of MCDM decision making under uncertainty
through the development of double Sugeno Integrals.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof (Proposition 1). The proofs relative to these results are quite similar, so
we show that U+−post(L) = 1 − U
τ−+
post (L), (i.e. 1 − U
+−
post(L) = U
τ−+
post (L)) and we
can apply the same principle to prove other utilities.
1− U+−post(L) = 1− [min
cj∈C
max((1− wj),max
xi∈X
min(uj(xi), L[xi]))]
= max
cj∈C
1− [max((1− wj),max
xi∈X
min(uj(xi), L[xi]))]
= max
cj∈C
min 1− [((1− wj),max
xi∈X
min(uj(xi), L[xi]))]
= max
cj∈C
min(wj , 1− [max
xi∈X
min(uj(xi), L[xi])])
= max
cj∈C
min(wj , min
xi∈X
1− [min(uj(xi), L[xi])])
= max
cj∈C
min(wj , min
xi∈X
max 1− [(uj(xi), L[xi])])
= max
cj∈C
min(wj , min
xi∈X
max(1−uj(xi), (1−L[xi]) = max
cj∈C
min(wj , min
xi∈X
max(uτj (xi), (1−
L[xi])
= Uτ−+post (L). ⊓⊔
Proof (Propositon 2). In the following, we illustrate the proof relative to equiv-
alence between U++ante(L) and U
++
post(L). The proof relative to U
−− is similar by
replacing max by min, L[xi] by (1− L[xi]) and wj by (1− wj).
U++ante(L) = max
xi∈X
min(L[xi],max
cj∈C
min(uj(xi), wj))
= max
xi∈X
min(max(min(u1(xi), w1),min(u2(xi), w2), . . . ,min(up(xi), wp)), L[xi])
= max
xi∈X
max(min(min(u1(xi), L[xi]), w1),min(min(u2(xi), L[xi]), w2), . . . ,min(min(up(xi), L[xi]), wp))
= max
cj∈C
max
xi∈X
(min(min(L[xi], uj(xi))), wj)
= max
cj∈C
max(min(min(L[x1], uj(x1)), wj),min(min(L[x2], uj(x2)), wj), . . . ,min(min(L[xn], uj(xn)), wj))
= max
cj∈C
min(max(min(L[x1], uj(x1)),min(L[x2], uj(x2)), . . . ,min(L[xn], uj(xn))), wj)
= max
cj∈C
min(max
xi∈X
(min(L[xi], ujxi)), wj)
= U++post(L). ⊓⊔
Proof (Propositon 3). To prove that Uante utilities satisfy the weak monotonicity
property, we proceed by proving that U++ante (resp. U
−−
ante) and U
+−
ante (resp. U
−+
ante)
are equivalent to their equivalent in context of mono-criterion decision making
i.e. U+ (resp.U−) that are known as monotonic. While the principle is always
the same, we will limit to the proof relative to the reduction of U++ante to U
+.
U++(〈α\L1, β\L2, . . . γLm〉).
= U++(red(〈α\L1, β\L2, . . . γLm〉)).
= U+(Agg+(red(〈α\L1, β\L2, . . . γLm〉))).
= U+(Agg+(max(min(α,L1[x1]),min(β, L2[x1]), . . .min(γ, Lm[x1]))\u1,
max(min(α,L1[x2]),min(β, L2[x2]), . . .min(γ, Lm[x2]))\u2,
. . .max(min(α,L1[xq]),min(β, L2[xq]), . . .min(γ, Lm[xq]))\uq.
= U+(max(min(α,L1[x1]),min(β, L2[x1]), . . .min(γ, Lm[x1]))\max(min(u11, w1),min(u12, w2), . . .min(u1p, wp))),
max(min(α,L1[x2]),min(β, L2[x2]), . . .min(γ, Lm[x2]))\max(min(u21, w1),min(u22, w2), . . .min(u2p, wp))),
. . .max(min(α,L1[xq]),min(β, L2[xq]), . . .min(γ, Lm[xq]))\max(min(uq1, w1),min(uq2, w2), . . .min(uqp, wp))).
= U+(red(α\〈L1[x1]\max(min(u11, w1), . . .min(u1p, wp)), . . . L1[xq]\max(min(uq1, w1), . . .min(uqp, wp))〉,
. . . γ\〈Lm[x1]\max(min(u11, w1), . . .min(u1p, wp)), . . . Lm[xq]\max(min(uq1, w1), . . .min(uqp, wp))〉.))
= U+(red(α\Agg+(L1), β\Agg
+(L2) . . . γ\Agg
+(Lm))). ⊓⊔
Proof (Proposition 4).We have proven that U++ante (resp. U
−−
ante) equals to U
++
post(resp.
U−−post), also we have shown that U
++
ante and U
−−
ante are monotonic. So, we can con-
clude that U++post and U
++
post satisfy the weak monotonicity property.
Proof (Proposition 5). we have defined U−+post(L) = max
j=1,p
min(wj , min
xi∈X
max((1 −
L[xi]), uj(xi))) and U
−
j (L) = min
xi∈X
max((1− L[xi]), uj(xi)). So, U
−+
post(L) can be
expressed as follows: U−+post(L) = max
j=1,p
min(wj , U
−
j (L))
Proof (Proposition 6).We suppose that∆∗ = {L∗1, . . . , L
∗
p} and ∀L ∈ L, U
−
j (L
∗
k) ≥
U−j (Lk), we have to prove that: for any L ∈ L, U
−+
post(L
∗) ≥ U−+post(L).
We start by verifying if min(wj , U
−
j (L
∗
k)) ≥ min(wj , U
−
j (Lk))
– If (wj ≤ U
−
j (Lk)) then:
min(wj , U
−
j (L
∗
k)) = min(wj , U
−
j (Lk)) = wj
– Else if (wj ≥ U
−
j (Lk)) then:
• If (wj ≤ U
−
j (L
∗
k)) then:
min(wj , U
−
j (L
∗
k)) = wj ≤ min(wj , U
−
j (Lk)) = U
−
j (Lk)
• If (wj ≥ U
−
j (L
∗
k)) then:
min(wj , U
−
j (L
∗
k)) = U
−
j (L
∗
k) ≥ min(wj , U
−
j (Lk)) = U
−
j (Lk)
Then, min(wj , U
−
j (L
∗
k)) ≥ min(wj , U
−
j (Lk))
So, max
j
min(wj , U
−
j (L
∗
k)) ≥ maxj
min(wj , U
−
j (Lk))
Proof (Proposition 7).We have defined U+−post(L) = min
j=1,p
max((1−wj),max
xi∈X
min(L[xi], uj(xi)))
and U+j (L) = max
xi∈X
min(L[xi], uj(xi)) So, U
+−
post(L) can be expressed as follows:
U+−post(L) = min
j=1,p
max((1− wj), U
+
j (L)).
